Independence referendum

Lore & Background

An independence referendum typically arises after political success for nationalists of a territory, which could come from the election of politicians or parties with separatist policies, or from pressure from nationalist organisations. Negotiations for the terms of the referendum may take place between the nationalists and the government that exercises sovereignty over the territory. If terms can be agreed, the referendum can be held with its result binding and respected by the international community. Without consent of the national or federal governments, the international community relies on factors such as whether the local people were oppressed by the central government to decide if the result can be recognized.

Reader's Guide

Independence referendums are significant because they provide a formal mechanism for a territory's population to express a preference for sovereignty, yet their outcomes are not automatically binding. The process hinges on negotiations between nationalists and the sovereign government, covering issues like the date, voter eligibility, ballot questions, and what constitutes a binding result—often a simple majority or a quota. Successful negotiations are hard to achieve because governments can be reluctant to give up sovereignty, as seen when the Spanish government opposed a planned 2014 Catalan referendum, making it unofficial and non-binding. In the aftermath of a vote for independence, negotiations on secession terms may follow, leading to a declaration of independence and possible international recognition. A vote against independence can still sustain nationalist movements and calls for a rerun, as with Quebec's two referendums and the Scottish National Party's push for a repeat after the United Kingdom left the European Union. The legacy of independence referendums includes both peaceful transitions to statehood and contested, partially recognized states from unilateral declarations.

Did You Know?

• An independence referendum that results in a vote for independence does not always ultimately result in independence.
• Negotiations for an independence referendum can include lowering the voting age, as was done for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.
• The 2014 Catalan referendum was unofficial and non-binding due to opposition from the Spanish government.
• After two referendums in Quebec, the Parti Québécois has continued to raise the prospect of holding another referendum.

The 2014 Vote and Its Political Wake

The September 2014 referendum saw Scotland choose to remain within the United Kingdom, with 55% voting against independence and 45% in favour. Both sides framed the contest as a singular, generational moment. The Scottish Government's white paper described a Yes vote as a 'once in a generation opportunity to follow a different path,' a framing echoed by SNP leader Alex Salmond, who pointed to the eighteen-year gap between the 1979 and 1997 devolution referendums as evidence of how rarely such a choice arose. The UK Government similarly portrayed the vote as once-in-a-generation. Key debates centred on Scotland's EU membership, with unionists warning that independence would require a fresh application, while independence supporters noted Cameron's own pledge of an in-out EU referendum. Economic anxieties also loomed large, as major banks like the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group were reported to be weighing relocation of their registered offices to London. In the referendum's aftermath, the cross-party Smith Commission proposed new devolved policy areas in taxation and welfare, explicitly noting that nothing in its report prevented Scotland from seeking independence in the future. These recommendations culminated in the Scotland Act 2016, which formalised the expanded devolution in time for the 2016 Scottish Parliament election.

Brexit as the Trigger for a Second Vote

The SNP's position after 2014 was that a second independence referendum should be held if there was a 'material change of circumstances,' and the party identified the UK's departure from the European Union as precisely such a shift. When the Leave campaign won the June 2016 Brexit referendum, the result in Scotland was stark: 62% of Scottish voters had opposed leaving the EU. This divergence between Scotland and the UK-wide outcome became the central argument for a renewed independence push. In 2017, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon secured Scottish Parliament approval to seek a Section 30 Order under the Scotland Act 1998, which would transfer the power to hold an independence referendum to Edinburgh 'when the shape of the UK's Brexit deal will become clear.' However, no Prime Minister to date has granted such a transfer. The SNP's 2015 general election landslide—winning 56 of 59 Scottish seats and 50% of the national vote—had already signalled the strength of pro-independence sentiment, and the party entered the 2016 Scottish Parliament election on the explicit platform that Brexit warranted a second referendum. The SNP went on to form a minority government after that election, setting the stage for the years of constitutional negotiation that followed.

The Road to October 2023

In January 2021, the SNP made a clear pledge: if pro-independence parties secured a parliamentary majority in the upcoming 2021 Scottish election, the government would introduce a bill for an independence referendum. That threshold was met. The SNP and the Scottish Green Party, both supporters of independence, won a majority of seats and entered government together under the Bute House Agreement. With a legislative mandate in hand, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon announced in June 2022 plans to hold a referendum on 19 October 2023. The UK Government, however, rejected Sturgeon's request to hold the vote in July 2022. The debate did not end there. Under the leadership of Humza Yousaf and subsequently John Swinney, the question of a second referendum remained a live political issue. Swinney, the incumbent First Minister, has committed to delivering independence if re-elected in the 2026 Scottish Parliament election. The trajectory from the 2021 electoral mandate through the 2022 announcement and its rejection illustrates how the independence question has become inextricably linked to the broader constitutional relationship between Edinburgh and Westminster.

The Supreme Court and Constitutional Limits

The legal architecture governing a potential second referendum proved to be as contentious as the politics. The central question—whether the Scottish Parliament could hold an independence referendum without the UK Government's consent—was referred to the UK Supreme Court. In November 2022, the Court ruled that an independence referendum falls outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament, effectively confirming that Edinburgh cannot unilaterally trigger such a vote. This ruling underscored the limitations of the Section 30 mechanism under the Scotland Act 1998, the very provision Sturgeon had sought to invoke in 2017 to transfer referendum powers to Scotland. The fact that no Prime Minister had ever granted a Section 30 Order meant the Scottish Government remained dependent on Westminster's cooperation. The Supreme Court's decision thus closed off the legal pathway for a unilateral referendum and reinforced the principle that questions of the Union's fundamental structure remain reserved matters. For the pro-independence movement, the ruling sharpened the political stakes: any future referendum would require either a change in the constitutional settlement or a transfer of powers from the UK Government, making the 2026 election and the broader relationship between the two parliaments the decisive battleground.